Abstract. We consider the problem of securely computing the k thranked element in a sequence of n private integers distributed among n parties. The k th -ranked element (e.g., minimum, maximum, median) is of particular interest in benchmarking, which allows a company to compare its own key performance indicator to the statistics of its peer group. The individual integers are sensitive data, yet the k th -ranked element is of mutual interest to the parties. Previous secure computation protocols for the k th -ranked element require a communication channel between each pair of parties. They do not scale to a large number of parties as they are highly interactive resulting in longer delays. Moreover, they are difficult to deploy as special arrangements are required between each pair of parties to establish a secure connection. A server model naturally fits with the client-server architecture of Internet applications in which clients are connected to the server and not to other clients. It can simplify secure computation by reducing the number of rounds, and as a result, improve its performance and scalability. In this model, there are communication channels only between each client and the server, while only clients provide inputs to the computation. Hence, it is a centralized communication pattern, i.e., a star network. We propose different approaches for privately computing the k th -ranked element in the server model, using either garbled circuits or threshold homomorphic encryption. Our schemes have a constant number of rounds and can compute the k th -ranked element within seconds for up to 50 clients in a WAN.
Introduction
Given n parties each holding a private integer, we consider the problem of securely computing the k th -ranked element (KRE) of these n integers. This is a secure multiparty computation (SMC) where several parties wish to compute a publicly known function on their private input while revealing only the output of the computation to a designated subset of parties and nothing else. The computation of the k th -ranked element is of particular interest in settings such as collaborative benchmarking, where the individual inputs are sensitive data, yet the k th -ranked element is of mutual interest to all parties [2, 26] .
Benchmarking. A key performance indicator (KPI) is a statistical quantity measuring the performance of a business process. Benchmarking is a management process where a company compares its KPI to the statistics of the same KPIs of a group of competitors from a peer group. Examples of KPIs from different company operations are make cycle time (manufacturing), cash flow (financial) and employee fluctuation rate (human resources). A peer group is a group of similar companies, usually competitors, wanting to compare against each other. Examples formed along different characteristics include car manufacturers (industry sector), Fortune 500 companies in the United States (revenue and location). A big challenge for benchmarking is that KPIs are sensitive and confidential, even within a single company [26] .
Confidentiality. Confidentiality is of the utmost importance in benchmarking, since KPIs allow the inference of sensitive information. Companies are therefore hesitant to share their business performance data due to the risk of losing a competitive advantage [26] . The confidentiality issue can be addressed using SMC [4, 19, 37] , which guarantees that no party will learn more than the output of the protocol, i.e., the other parties' inputs remain confidential.
Communication Model. There exist several secure protocols that can be used for keeping KPIs confidential while comparing them [2, 4, 19, 37] . They require a communication channel between each pair of input parties. We will refer to this approach as the standard model. Protocols in the standard model do not scale easily to a large number of parties as they require a communication channel between any pair of parties and are highly interactive, resulting in high latency. Moreover, they are difficult to deploy as special arrangements are required between each pair of parties to establish a secure connection [10] . A promising approach for overcoming these limitations is to use the help of a small set of untrusted non-colluding servers. We will therefore refer to it as the server model. In this model, the servers make their computational resources available for the computation, but have no input to the computation and receive no output [24, 26] . For example, Jakobsen et al. [22] propose a framework in which the input parties (the clients) delegate the computation to a set of untrusted workers. Relying on multiple non-colluding servers requires a different business model for the service provider of a privacy-preserving service. The service provider has to share benefits with an almost equal peer offering its computational power [27] . We therefore use a communication model consisting of clients (with private inputs) and a server. In this model, the server provides no input to the computation and does not learn the output, but makes its computational resources available to the clients [24, 26] . Moreover, there are communication channels only between each client and the server. Hence, it is a centralized communication pattern, i.e., a star network. As a result, the clients will only communicate with the server, but never directly amongst each other. This model naturally fits with the clientserver architecture of Internet applications and allows a service provider to play the server's role. It can simplify the secure protocol, and improve its performance and scalability [10, 23, 24] . 
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Kre-Ygc Kre-Ahe1 Kre-She [1] sym. asym. Table 3 : Schemes' Complexity: Rows CC-C/S and BC-C/S denote the computation and communication (bit) complexity for each client and the server, respectively. The columns "sym." and "asym." denote symmetric and asymmetric operations in Kre-Ygc.
Contribution. In summary, we propose different approaches for securely computing the k th -ranked element (KRE) in a star network using either garbled circuits (GC) or additive homomorphic encryption (AHE) or somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE):
-Our first scheme Kre-Ygc uses Yao's GC [3, 32] to compare clients' inputs.
-Our second scheme Kre-Ahe1 is based on threshold AHE. We first propose a modified variant of the Lin-Tzeng comparison protocol [31] . The server then uses it to compare inputs encrypted with AHE. -In our third scheme Kre-Ahe2, we continue with threshold AHE, however, we perform the comparison using the DGK protocol [14] . -The fourth scheme Kre-She is based on SHE and allows the server to noninteractively compute the KRE such that the clients only interact to jointly decrypt the result.
We compare the approaches in Tables 2 and 3 using the following measures:
-Number of rounds: In contrast to [1] , all our protocols have a constant number of rounds. -Collusion-resistance: This is a protocol property that is measured by the number of parties that can collude without violating the privacy of the noncolluding ones. In Kre-Ygc a collusion with the server completely breaks the security, while Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2 can tolerate the collusion of several clients with the server as long as the number of colluding clients is smaller than a threshold t. If the server does not collude, then Kre-Ygc can tolerate up to n−1 colluding clients. Aggarwal et al.'s scheme [1] is collusionresistant if implemented with a threshold scheme. -Fault-tolerance: It is a protocol property that is measured by the number of parties that can fail without preventing the protocol to properly compute the intended functionality. Our server model can only tolerate clients' failure. Kre-Ygc is not fault-tolerant while Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2 can tolerate failure of up to n − t clients. Aggarwal et al.'s scheme [1] is faulttolerant if implemented with a threshold scheme. -Complexity: This refers to the asymptotic computation complexity as well as the communication complexity. A summary is illustrated in Table 3 . We provide a detailed analysis in Appendix C.
Structure. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin by presenting related work in Section 2 and some preliminaries in Section 3. We present our security model in Section 4 and a technical overview in Section 5. The different approaches are presented in Sections 6 to 9. We discuss some implementation details and evaluation results in Section 10, before concluding our work in Section 11. We provide further details such as security proofs and complexity analysis in the appendix.
Our work is related to secure multiparty computation (SMC). There are several generic SMC protocols [4, 13, 15, 25] that can be used to compute the k thranked element of the union of n private datasets. In practice, specialized protocols offer better performance as they use domain knowledge of the required functionality to optimize the secure protocol. Aggarwal et al. [2] introduced the first specialized protocol for computing the k th -ranked element. Their multiparty protocol performs a binary search in the input domain resulting in O(µ) comparisons and, hence, requiring O(µ) sequential rounds. Each round requires a secure computation that performs two summations with complexity O(nµ) and two comparisons with complexity O(µ). As a result each client requires O(nµ 2 + µ 2 ) operations and sends O(nµ 2 + µ 2 ) bits. Our protocols perform O(n 2 ) comparisons, that can be executed in parallel, and have a constant number of rounds. A summary of the complexity of our schemes is illustrated in Table 3 .
The server model for SMC was introduced in [17] . Kerschbaum [27] proposed an approach allowing a service provider to offer a SMC service by himself. The cryptographic study of the server model was initiated in [23, 24] . They all provide a generic solution for SMC while our approaches propose specialized protocol for the k th -ranked element. The computation of the k th -ranked element is also addressed in [5, 6] where the server is replaced by a blockchain. While the first one [5] relies on Fischlin's comparison protocol [18] , the second one [6] relies on the DGK comparison protocol [14] . The technical difficulty relies in the fact that parties must prove correct execution of the protocol which is done using zero-knowledge proofs resulting in maliciously secure protocols. These protocol requires only 3 rounds of computation, however they leak the order of the inputs to the parties.
Preliminaries
A Garbled Circuit (GC) [3, 16, 32, 38] can be used to execute any function privately between two parties. To evaluate a function f on input x i , x j , a garbling scheme (F, e) ← Gb(1 λ , s, f ) takes a security parameter λ, a random seed s, a Boolean encoding of f and outputs a garbled circuit F and an encoding string e that is used to derive corresponding garbled inputsx i ,x j from x i , x j , i.e. there is a function En such thatx i ← En(e, x i ) andx j ← En(e, x j ). The garbling scheme is correct if
A homomorphic encryption (HE) allows computations on ciphertexts by generating an encrypted result whose decryption matches the result of a function on the plaintexts. A HE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
-pk, sk, ek ← KeyGen(λ): This probabilistic algorithm takes a security parameter λ and outputs public, private and evaluation key pk, sk and ek. -c ← Enc(pk, m): This probabilistic algorithm takes pk and a message m and outputs a ciphertext c. We will denote Enc(pk, m) by ⟦m⟧ (see Table 1 ).
-c ← Eval(ek, f, c 1 , . . . , c n ): This probabilistic algorithm takes ek, an n-ary function f and n ciphertexts c 1 , . . . c n and outputs a ciphertext c. -m ′ ← Dec(sk, c): This deterministic algorithm takes sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a message m ′ .
We require IND-CPA and the following correctness conditions ∀m 1 , . . . , m n :
If the scheme supports only addition, then it is additively homomorphic. Schemes such as [28, 33] are additively homomorphic and have the following properties:
A Threshold Homomorphic Encryption (THE) [7, 13] allows to share the private key to the parties using a threshold secret sharing scheme such that a subset of parties is required for decryption. Hence, instead of sk as above, the key generation outputs a set of shares SK = {sks 1 , . . . , sks n } which are distributed to the clients. The decryption algorithm is replaced by the following algorithms:
The probabilistic partial decryption algorithm takes a ciphertext c and a share sks i ∈ SK of the private key and outputsm i .
The deterministic final decryption algorithm takes a subset M t = {m j1 , . . . ,m jt } ⊆ {m 1 , . . . ,m n } of partial decryption shares and outputs a message m ′ .
We refer to it as threshold decryption. It is correct if for all M t = {m j1 , . . . ,m jt } such that M t ≥ t andm ji = Decp(sks ji , ⟦m⟧), it holds m = Decf (M t ). When used in a protocol, we denote by combiner the party which is responsible to execute algorithm Decf (). Depending on the protocol, the combiner can be any party. It receives a set M t = {m j1 , . . . ,m jt } of ciphertexts, runs m ′ ← Decf (M t ) and publishes the result or move to the next step of the protocol specification.
Security Definition
This section provides definitions related to our model and security requirements. We start by defining the k th -ranked element of a sequence of integers. Definition 1. Let X = {x 1 , ..., x n } be a set of n distinct integers andx 1 , . . . ,x n be the corresponding sorted set, i.e.,x 1 ≤ . . . ≤x n , and X = {x 1 , . . . ,x n }. The rank of an element x i ∈ X is j, such that x i =x j . The k th -ranked element (KRE) is the elementx k with rank k.
If the rank is k = ⌈ n 2 ⌉ then the element is called median. If k = 1 (resp. k = n) then the element is called minimum (resp. maximum).
Definition 2. Let C 1 , . . . , C n be n clients each holding a private µ-bit integer x 1 , . . . , x n and S be a server which has no input. Our ideal functionality F KRE receives x 1 , . . . , x n from the clients, computes the KREx k and outputsx k to each client C i . Moreover, F KRE outputs a leakage L i to each C i and L S to S.
The leakage is specific to each protocol and contains information such as n, t, λ, κ, µ (see Table 1 ). It can be inferred from the party's view which is all that the party is allowed to learn from the protocol execution. In case of limited collusion (i.e., the number of colluding parties is smaller than a given threshold as given in Table 2 ) additional leakage might include comparison results between some pair of inputs or the rank of some inputs.
Definition 3. The view of the i-th party during an execution of the protocol on input ⃗ x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is denoted by:
where r i represents the outcome of the i-th party's internal coin tosses, and m ij represents the j-th message it has received.
Since the server is a party without input, x i in its view will be replaced by the empty string. We say that two distributions D 1 and D 2 are computationally indistinguishable (denoted D 1 c ≡ D 1 ) if no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can distinguish them except with negligible probability.
In this paper, we assume that parties follow the protocol specification, but the adversary keeps a record of all messages received by corrupted parties and tries to infer as much information as possible. Our adversary is, therefore, semi-honest. SMC security requires that what a party can learn from the protocol execution, can be inferred from its input and output only. The protocol is said secure if for each party, one can construct a simulator that given only the input and the output can generate a distribution that is computationally indistinguishable to the party's view.
µ be the functionality that takes n µ-bit inputs x 1 , . . . , x n and returns their KRE. Let I = {i 1 , . . . , i t } ⊂ {1, . . . , n+1} be a subset of indexes of corrupted parties (Server's input x n+1 is empty), ⃗ x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and
A protocol t-privately computes F KRE in the semi-honest model if there exists a polynomial-time simulator SIM such that: ∀I, I = t and L I = ⋃ i∈I L i , it holds:
In an initialization phase, clients generate and exchange necessary cryptographic keys through the server. We assume the existence of a trusted third party (e.g., a certificate authority) which certifies public keys or generates keys for a threshold cryptosystem. Moreover the trusted third party is not allowed to take part in the main protocol or to collude with any party including the server. We stress that the initialization phase is run once and its complexity does not depend on the functionality that we want to compute. In the following, we therefore focus on the actual computations.
We determine the KRE in the main protocol by computing the rank of each x i and selecting the right one. To achieve that, we compare pairs of inputs (x i , x j ), 1 ≤ i, j, ≤ n and denote the result by a comparison bit b ij .
is defined as 1 if x i ≥ x j and 0 otherwise. The computation of x i ≥ x j is distributed and involves C i , C j , where they play different roles, e.g., generator and evaluator. Similar to the functional programming notation of an ordered pair, we use head and tail to denote C i and C j .
For each input x i , we then add all bits b ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ n to get its rank r i . Lemma 1. Let x 1 , . . . , x n be n distinct integers, and let r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ {1, . . . , n} be their corresponding ranks and b ij the comparison bit for (x i , x j ). It holds
Proof. Since r i is the rank of x i , x i is by definition larger or equal to r i elements in {x 1 , . . . , x n }. This means that r i values among b i1 , . . . , b in are 1 and the remaining n − r i values are 0. It follows that ∑ n j=1 b ij = r i .
The above lemma requires distinct inputs. To make sure that clients' inputs are indeed distinct before the protocol execution, we borrow the idea of [2] and use the index of parties as differentiator. Each party C i represents its index i as a log n-bit string and appends it at the end (i.e., in the least significant positions) of the binary string of x i , resulting in a new input of length µ+log n. For simplicity, we assume in the remainder of the paper, that the x i 's are all distinct µ-bit integers. Therefore, it is not necessary to compare all pairs (x i , x j ), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, since we can deduce b ji from b ij .
As explained in Definition 5, C i , C j play different role in the comparison for (x i , x j ). Therefore, we would like to equally distribute the roles among the clients. As example for n = 3, we need to compute only three (instead of nine) comparisons resulting in three head roles and three tail roles. Then we would like each of the three clients to play the role head as well as tail exactly one time. We will use Definition 6 and Lemma 2 to equally distribute the roles head and tail between clients. Definition 6. Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a set of n integers. We define the predicate Paired as follows:
Lemma 2. Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a set of n integers and the predicate Paired be as above. Then comparing only pairs (x i , x j ) such that Paired(i, j) = true is enough to compute the rank of all elements in X.
is defined as follows:
Clearly, P contains the maximum number of comparisons required to compute the rank of every x i ∈ X. Now it suffices to show that:
1. P 1 and P 2 form a partition of P 2. ∀ (x i , x j ) ∈ P ∶ (x i , x j ) ∈ P 1 ⇔ (x j , x i ) ∈ P 2 P 1 and P 2 are clearly subsets of P. For each (x i , x j ) ∈ P, (i, j) satisfies exactly one of the conditions (1a), . . . , (1d), (2a), . . . , (2d), hence P ⊆ P 1 ∪ P 2 . Moreover, for each (x i , x j ) ∈ P, either Paired(i, j) = true or Q(i, j) = true. It follows that P 1 ∩ P 2 = ∅ which concludes the proof of claim 1. To prove claim 2, it suffices to see that, (i, j) satisfies condition (1a) if and only if (j, i) satisfies condition (2a). The same holds for (1b) and (2b), (1c) and (2c), (1d) and (2d).
For example, if n = 3, we compute comparison bits only for (x 1 , x 2 ), (x 2 , x 3 ), (x 3 , x 1 ) and deduce the remaining comparison bits from the computed ones. If
The predicate Paired (Equation 1) is used in our schemes to reduce the number of comparisons and to equally distribute the computation task of the comparisons among the clients. Let #head i (resp. #tail i ) denote the number of times Paired(i, j) = true (resp. Paired(j, i) = true) holds. For example, if n = 3, we have #head i = #tail i = 1 for all clients. However, for n = 4, we have #head 1 = #head 3 = 2, #tail 1 = #tail 3 = 1, #head 2 = #head 4 = 1 and #tail 2 = #tail 4 = 2.
Lemma 3. Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a set of integers and assume the predicate Paired is used to sort X. If n is odd then:
If n is even then:
Proof. This is actually a corollary of the proof of Lemma 2. It follows from the fact that (x i , x j ) ∈ P 1 ⇔ (x j , x i ) ∈ P 2 and any x i is involved in n − 1 comparisons (since we need b i1 , . . . , b in to compute r i = ∑ n j=1 b ij , where we trivially have b ii = 1 without comparison). This proves the case when n is odd. If n is even then the odd case applies for n ′ = n − 1. Then for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n ′ }, we have Paired(i, n) = true if i is odd (condition 1b) and Paired(n, i) = true if i is even (condition 1c).
Protocol Kre-Ygc
This section describes Kre-Ygc (Protocol 1) based on GC which consists of an initialization and a main protocol. During initialization, parties generate and distribute cryptographic keys. The online protocol uses GC to compare the inputs and AHE to compute the rank of each x i from the comparison bits. We denote an AHE ciphertext with ⟦⋅⟧ (see Table 1 ).
Kre-Ygc Initialization
The initialization consists of public key distribution and Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement. Each client C i sends its public key pk i (e.g., using a pseudonym certificate) of an AHE to the server. The server then distributes the public keys to the clients. In our implementation, we use the Paillier [33] scheme, but any AHE scheme such as [28] will work as well. Then each pair (C i , C j ) of clients runs DH key exchange through the server to generate a common secret key ck ij = ck ji . The common key ck ij is used by C i and C j to seed the pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) of the garbling scheme that is used to generate a comparison GC for x i and x j , i.e. Gb(1 λ , ck ij , f > ), where f > is a Boolean comparison circuit.
Kre-Ygc Main Protocol
Protocol 1 is a four-round protocol in which we use GC to compare pairs of inputs and to reveal a blinded comparison bit to the server. Then we use AHE to unblind the comparison bits, compute the ranks and the KRE without revealing anything to the parties. Let f > be defined as:
where a i , a j ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., f > compares x i , x j and blinds the comparison bits b ij with a i , a j .
Comparing Inputs. For each pair (x i , x j ), if Paired(i, j) = true the parties do the following: 
, and sends only (ā ij j ,x ij j ) to the server S.
The server then evaluates all GCs (Steps 1 to 5).
Unblinding Comparison Bits. Using AHE, the parties unblind each b
is known to C i and a ij j is known to C j , without learning anything. As a result ⟦b ij ⟧ i and ⟦b ji ⟧ j are revealed to S encrypted under pk i and pk j . This is illustrated in Steps 6 to 16 and works as follows:
Computing the Rank. The computation of the rank is done at the server by homomorphically adding comparison bits. Hence for each i, the server computes ⟦r i ⟧ i = ⟦∑ n j=1 b ij ⟧ i . Then, it chooses a random number α i and computes ⟦β i ⟧ i = ⟦(r i − k) ⋅ α i ⟧ i (Steps 17 to 19). The ciphertext ⟦β i ⟧ i encrypts 0 if r i = k (i.e., x i is the k th -ranked element) otherwise it encrypts a random plaintext.
Computing the KRE's Ciphertext. Each client C i receives ⟦β i ⟧ i encrypted under its public key pk i and decrypts it. Then if β i = 0, C i sets m i = x i otherwise m i = 0. Finally, C i encrypts m i under each client's public key and sends ⟦m i ⟧ 1 , . . . , ⟦m i ⟧ n to the server (Steps 20 to 22).
Revealing the KRE's Ciphertext. In the final steps (Steps 23 to 24), the server adds all ⟦m j ⟧ i encrypted under pk i and reveals ⟦∑ n j=1 m j ⟧ i to C i . Kre-Ygc protocol correctly computes the KRE. The proof trivially follows from the correctness of the GC protocol, Lemmas 1 and 2 and the correctness of the AHE scheme. Kre-Ygc is not fault-tolerant and a collusion with the server reveals all inputs to the adversary.
Protocol Kre-Ahe1
This section describes Kre-Ahe1 (Protocol 4) based on threshold AHE. KreAhe1 compares all inputs (using our modified variant of the Lin-Tzeng protocol [31] ) at the server which then randomly distributes encrypted comparison bits to the clients for threshold decryption.
We assume threshold key generation. Hence, there is a public/private key pair (pk, sk) for an AHE, where the private key sk is split in n shares sks 1 , . . . , sks n such that client C i gets share sks i and at least t shares are required to reconstruct sk. Additionally, each client C i has its own AHE key pair (pk i , sk i ) and publishes pk i to all clients. We denote by ⟦x i ⟧, ⟦x i ⟧ j encryptions of x i under pk, pk j respectively (Table 1 ).
Modified Lin-Tzeng Comparison Protocol
We first describe our modified version of the Lin-Tzeng comparison protocol [31] . The main idea of their construction is to reduce the greater-than comparison to the set intersection problem of prefixes.
Input
where
il are random numbers of a fixed bitlength ν > µ (e.g.
il < 2 µ+1 ) with LSB(r
il ) = 0 and LSB(r
il ) = 1 (LSB is the least significant bit). If the Int function is used the compute the element at position l, then we call it a proper encoded element otherwise we call it a random encoded element. Note that a random encoded element r (1) il at position l in the 1-encoding of x i is chosen such that it is guaranteed to be different to a proper or random encoded element at position l in the 0-encoding of x j , and vice versa. Hence, it is enough if r If x i > x j then there exists a position l such that for each h, µ ≥ h ≥ l+1, x ih = x jh and x il = 1 and x jl = 0. This implies u il = v il .
For
Difference to the original protocol. In contrast to the original protocol of [31] , we note the following differences:
-Additively HE instead of multiplicative: It suits best with our setting and can be implemented using ElGamal on elliptic curve with better performance and smaller ciphertexts. While decrypting requires solving discrete logarithm, this is however not necessary since we are looking for ciphertexts encrypting 0. -Int function: Instead of relying on a collision-free hash function as [31] , we use the Int function which is simpler to implement and more efficient as it produces smaller values. -Choice of random encoded elements r (0) il , r (1) il : We choose the random encoded elements as explained above and encrypt them, while the original protocol uses ciphertexts chosen randomly in the ciphertext space.
-Encrypting the encodings on both side: In the original protocol, the evaluator has access to x j in plaintext and does not need to choose random encoded elements. By encoding as explained in our modified version, we can encrypt both encodings and delegate the evaluation to a third party which is not allowed to have access to the inputs in plaintext.
Kre-Ahe1 Main Protocol
Protocol 4 is a four-round protocol in which the clients send their inputs encrypted using AHE under the common public key pk to the server. The server homomorphically evaluates comparison circuits on the encrypted inputs using our modified variant of the Lin-Tzeng protocol [31] . Then the clients jointly decrypt the comparison results and compute the rank of each x i .
Uploading Ciphertexts. Using the common public key pk, each client C i sends ⟦x i ⟧, ⟦V . . . , g 1n , . . . , g n1 , . . . , g nn ].
The server chooses n + 1 permutations π, π 1 , . . . , π n $ ← S n that hide the indexes of g ij to the clients during threshold decryption: π permutes the rows of G and each π i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n permutes the columns of row i. Let G ′ 1 , . . . , G ′ n be the rows of the resulting matrix G ′ (after application of the permutations to G). Using Algorithm 3, the server computes for each C i a t×n matrix G (i) consisting of the rows:
and the list of combiners for rows in G (i) are sent to C i in Step 11. An example is illustrated in Table 4 . Lemma 5 shows that the ciphertexts generated from Algorithm 3 allow to correctly decrypt the matrix G = [g 11 , . . . , g nn ], i.e., each g ij is distributed to exactly t different clients. By applying the lemma to the set of rows of G, the first part shows that each client receives exactly a subset of t different rows of G. The second part shows that each row of G is distributed to exactly t different clients which allows a correct threshold decryption of each row.
Lemma 5. Let X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a set of n elements, X i = {x i−t+1 , . . . , x i }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where the indexes in X i are computed modulo n, and t ≤ n. Then: -Each subset X i contains exactly t elements of X and -Each x ∈ X is in exactly t subsets X i .
Proof. It is clear from the definition that X i ⊆ X for all i and since i−(i−t+1)+1 = t, X i has exactly t elements. Let x i be in X, then from the definition, x i is element of only the subsets X i , X i+1 , . . . , X i+t−1 , where indexes of the X i are computed mod n. Again, it holds (i + t − 1) − i + 1 = t.
After receiving G (i) , each client C i performs its partial decryption for each ciphertext, re-encrypts each line l (l ∈ I (i) ) with the public key pk l of client C l . This prevents the server to learn comparison bits. Then C i sends the result h (i) l,j = ⟦Decp(sks i , g lj )⟧ l , (1 ≤ j ≤ n) to the server (Step 17). Client C l will be the combiner of the ciphertexts in line l. In Step 19, the server forwards the encrypted partial decryption results h Decp Decf g11, g12, g13 g32, g33, g31 C1, C2 C1 g21, g22, g23 g11, g13, g12 C2, C3 C2 g31, g32, g33 g23, g21, g22 C1, C3 C3 Table 4 : Threshold Decryption Example (n = 3, t = 2): The elements of G are permuted resulting in G ′ . Clients in columns "Decp" run Decp() on the corresponding row and send the result to the client in column "Decf" for the final decryption.
Algorithm 3: Decryption Request in Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2
Computing the KRE's Ciphertext. Each combiner C l computes the rank r l = ∑ n j=1 b lj (Step 27) and ciphertextc l that is either a re-encryption of c l if r l = k or an encryption of 0 otherwise (Step 28). The ciphertextc l is sent back to the server. The server multiplies allc l (Step 29) resulting in a ciphertextc of the KRE which is sent to a subset I t of t clients for threshold decryption (Step 32). Each client in I t performs a partial decryption (Step 34), encrypts the result for all clients and sends the ciphertexts to the server (Step 35). Finally, the sever forwards the encrypted partial decryption to the clients (Step 37) that they use to learn the KRE (Step 38).
Kre-Ahe1 protocol correctly computes the KRE. The proof trivially follows from the correctness of the Lin-Tzeng comparison protocol [31] , Lemmas 1 and 5 and the correctness of AHE. Kre-Ahe1 executes all O(n 2 ) comparisons noninteractively at the server, but requires threshold decryption for O(n 2 ) elements. The next protocol runs the O(n 2 ) comparisons in parallel with the help of the clients while requiring threshold decryption of only O(n) elements.
Protocol Kre-Ahe2
In this section, we describe Kre-Ahe2 (Protocol 7) which instantiates the comparison with the DGK protocol [14] . The initialization is similar to the previous case. We start by briefly reviewing the DGK protocol [14] . 10: for i ∶= 1 to n do 11: S → Ci:
. . , I
(i) t ] 13: for i ∶= 1 to n do 14: for u ∶= 1 to t do 15: for v ∶= 1 to n do 16:
uv )⟧ l 18: let {l1, . . . , lt} be the indexes of partial decryptors of the l-th row of G 19: for l ∶= 1 to n do 20: S → C l : c l 21: for j ∶= 1 to n do 22: 
DGK Comparison Protocol
Let (pk i , sk i ) be the public/private key pair of C i . Client C i will be called Generator and C j Evaluator. Privately evaluating x i ≥ x j works as follows:
and sends (⟦z µ ⟧, . . . , ⟦z 1 ⟧) to C i and outputs δ ji -C i computes δ ij ← DgkDec(⟦z µ ⟧, . . . , ⟦z 1 ⟧) (Algorithm 5) and outputs δ ij .
The comparison with the server is illustrated in Algorithm 5. For each pair C i , C j such that Paired(i, j) holds, the clients C i and C j run the DGK protocol with the server. The server forwards ⟦x
) and obtains δ ji , (⟦z iµ ⟧ i , . . . , ⟦z i1 ⟧ i ) as result. It then encrypts δ ji under the common public key and sends back ⟦z iµ ⟧ i , . . . , ⟦z i1 ⟧ i , ⟦δ ji ⟧ to client C i via the server. Client C i runs the decryption DgkDec(⟦z iµ ⟧ i , . . . , ⟦z i1 ⟧ i ), obtains a shared bit δ ij and sends back ⟦δ ij ⊕ δ ji ⟧ to the server. After the computation the clients C i and C j hold random shared bits δ ij and δ ji such that b ij = [x i ≤ x j ] = δ ij ⊕ δ ji holds. The server learns the encryption ⟦b ij ⟧ of the comparison bit b ij . In the DGK protocol clients C i and C j perform respectively O(µ) and O(6µ) asymmetric operations.
Kre-Ahe2 Main Protocol
Kre-Ahe2 is a 4-round protocol in which inputs are compared interactively using the DGK protocol. The resulting comparison bit is encrypted under pk and revealed to the server which then computes the ranks of the x i 's and trigger a threshold decryption.
Uploading Ciphertext. Each party C i sends ⟦x⟧ (encrypted under the common public key pk) and ⟦x b i ⟧ i = (⟦x iµ ⟧ i , . . . , ⟦x i1 ⟧ i ) (encrypted under its own public key pk i ) to the server. This is illustrated in Step 2 of protocol 7. The server then initializes a matrix G = [g 11 , . . . , g nn ], where g ii = ⟦1⟧ and g ij (i ≠ j) will be computed in the DGK protocol as g ij = ⟦b ij ⟧ if Paired(i, j) is true, and an array X = [⟦x 1 ⟧, . . . , ⟦x n ⟧] (Step 3).
Comparing Inputs. In this step, pairs of clients run DgkCompare with the server as illustrated in Algorithm 5. If (i, j) satisfies the predicate Paired, then C i runs the DGK protocol as generator and C j is the evaluator. After the computation, C i and C j get shares δ ij and δ ji of the comparison bit which is encrypted under pk as ⟦b ij ⟧ = ⟦δ ij ⊕ δ ji ⟧ and revealed to the server.
Computing the KRE's Ciphertext. After all admissible comparisons have been computed (and the result stored in the matrix G), the server uses Algorithm 6 to compute the rank of each input x i by homomorphically adding the comparison bits involving x i . Let ⟦r i ⟧ be a ciphertext initially encrypting 0 and let b ij = δ ij ⊕δ ji . For each j, if Paired(i, j) is true (i.e., ⟦b ij ⟧ has been computed) then we compute ⟦r i ⟧ ← ⟦r i + b ij ⟧. Otherwise (i.e., ⟦b ij ⟧ has not been computed but we can deduce it from ⟦b ji ⟧) we compute ⟦r i ⟧ ← ⟦r i + 1 − b ij ⟧. Now, the server has the encrypted rank ⟦r 1 ⟧, . . . , ⟦r n ⟧, where exactly one ⟦r i ⟧ encrypts k. Since we are looking for the element whose rank is k, the server then computes
where α i is a number chosen randomly in the plaintext space. Therefore, for the ciphertext ⟦r i ⟧ encrypting k, y i is equal to ⟦x i ⟧. Otherwise y i encrypts a random plaintext.
Decrypting the KRE's Ciphertext. In Step 12, the server distributes the result Y = [y 1 , . . . , y n ] of Algorithm 6 to the clients for threshold decryption. For that, the array Y is passed as n × 1 matrix to Algorithm 3. In Step 16, the server receives partial decryption results from the clients, forwards them to the corresponding combiner (Step 18). Each combiner C j performs a final decryption (Step 21) resulting in a messagex j whose bitlength is less or equal to µ if it is the KRE. Combiner C j then sets m (j) =x j if x j ≤ µ, otherwise m (j) = 0 (Step 22). Then m (j) is encrypted with the public key of all clients and send to the server (Step 23). Finally, the server reveals the KRE to all clients (Step 25). if Paired(i, j) then 8:
⟦ri⟧ ← ⟦ri⟧ ⋅ gij 9: else 10:
⟦ri⟧ ← ⟦ri⟧ ⋅ ⟦1⟧ ⋅ g
−1 ji
11:
Kre-Ahe2 protocol correctly computes the KRE. This trivially follows from the correctness of DGK protocol [14] , Lemmas 1 and 5 and the correctness of AHE. Kre-Ahe2 evaluates comparisons interactively but requires threshold decryption for O(n) elements. Notice that Kre-Ahe2 can be instantiated with the Lin-Tzeng protocol [31] as well. To compare x i , x j , C j will receive both ⟦V In Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2, we evaluated either the comparison (KreAhe1) or the rank (Kre-Ahe2) completely at the server. In the next scheme, we compute the KRE's ciphertext non-interactively at the server such that clients are only required for the threshold decryption of one ciphertext.
Protocol Kre-She
This section describes Kre-She based on SHE. Hence, ⟦x⟧ now represents an SHE ciphertext of the plaintext x. The initialization and threshold decryption are similar to Kre-Ahe1.
SHE Routines
Protocol 9 is based on the BGV scheme [9] as implemented in HElib [20] and requires binary plaintext space and Smart-Vercauteren ciphertext packing (SVCP) technique [36] .
Using SVCP, a ciphertext consists of a fixed number m of slots encrypting bits, i.e. ⟦⋅ ⋅ . . . ⋅⟧. The encryption of a bit b replicates b to all slots, i.e., ⟦b⟧ = ⟦b b . . . b⟧. However, we can pack the bits of x b i in one ciphertext and will denote it by ⟦⃗ x i ⟧ = ⟦x iµ . . . x i1 0 . . . 0⟧.
14: for i ∶= 1 to n do 15: for each j in
Each C i sends ⟦x b i ⟧, ⟦⃗ x i ⟧ to S as input to Algorithm 8 which uses built-in routines to compute the KRE. The routine SheAdd takes two or more ciphertexts and performs a componentwise addition mod 2, i.e., we have:
Similarly, for component-wise multiplication routine we have: There is no built-in routine for equality check in HElib. We implemented it using SheCmp and SheAdd. Let x i and x j be two µ-bit integers. We use SheEqual to denote the equality check routine and implement SheEqual(⟦x
by computing:
Kre-She Main Protocol
In Protocol 9 the server S receives encrypted inputs from clients. For each client's integer x i , the encrypted input consists of: i ⟧ of k and each rank, SheEqual checks the equality and returns an encrypted bit ⟦β i ⟧. Recall that because of SVCP the encryption of a bit β i is automatically replicated in all slots, i.e., ⟦β i ⟧ = ⟦β i β i . . . β i ⟧, such that evaluating ⟦ ⃗ y i ⟧ ← SheMult(⟦⃗ x i ⟧, ⟦β i ⟧), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and SheAdd(⟦ ⃗ y 1 ⟧, . . . , ⟦ ⃗ y n ⟧) returns the KRE's ciphertext. Recall that because of SVCP the encryption of a bit β i is automatically replicated in all slots, i.e.,
Correctness and security follow trivially from Lemma 1, correctness and security of SHE. The leakage is L S = L i = {n, t, κ, λ, µ}.
Evaluation
In this section, we discuss some implementation details and evaluate and compare our schemes.
Implementation Details
We implemented our schemes using software libraries SCAPI [16, 34] and HElib [20, 21] which we briefly describe here.
HElib As Kre-She mostly consists of the homomorphic evaluation by the server, we implemented Algorithm 8 using HElib [20] . HElib is a software library that implements homomorphic encryption. The current version of the library includes an implementation of the BGV lattice-based homomorphic encryption scheme [9] . It also includes various optimizations that make homomorphic encryption runs faster, including the Smart-Vercauteren ciphertext packing (SVCP) techniques [36] . We also implemented the threshold decryption for a n-out-of-n secret sharing of BGV's private key.
Experiments
In this section, we report on the experimental results of our implementations. We start by describing the experimental setup.
Experimental Setup. For Kre-Ygc, Kre-Ahe1, Kre-Ahe2, we conducted experiments using for the server a machine with a 6-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) E-2176M CPU @ 2.70GHz and 32GB of RAM, and for the clients two machines with each two Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-4880 v2 @ 2.50GHz. The client machines were equipped with 8GB and 4 GB of RAM, and were connected to the server via WAN. Windows 10 Enterprise was installed on all three machines.. Windows 10 Enterprise was installed on all three machines. For each experiment, about 3/5 of the clients were run on the machine with 8 GB RAM while about 2/5 were run on the machine with 4 GB RAM. We ran all experiments using JRE version 8.
Since the main computation of Kre-She is done on the server, we focus on evaluation Algorithm 8 on a Laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7300U CPU @ 2.60GHz running 16.04.1-Ubuntu with 4.10.0-14-lowlatency Kernel version.
Results. We evaluated Kre-Ygc, Kre-Ahe1, Kre-Ahe2 at security level λ = 128, bitlength µ = 32 and (minimal) threshold t = 2 for threshold decryption. We instantiated Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2 with Elliptic Curve ElGamal (see Appendix A) using elliptic curve secp256r1. Figure 8 shows our performance results which are summarized in Table 5 for n = 100 clients. In Table 5 , we also illustrate the costs when t = 1 (i.e., each C i knows sk) for both Kre-Ahe2 and Kre-Ahe1 and when t = n (i.e. all C i must participate in the threshold decryption) for Kre-Ahe2.
Kre-Ygc is the most efficient in both computation and communication and takes 197 seconds to each client to compute the KRE of 100 clients in a WAN setting. The communication is 0.31 MB for each client and 5.42 MB for the server. However, Kre-Ygc is neither collusion-resistant nor fault-tolerant.
Kre-Ahe2 is the second most efficient and is collusion-resistant and faulttolerant. Although it requires more interactions to compute comparisons, we batched many comparisons together and were able to run threshold decryption for O(n) elements, instead of O(n 2 ) as in Kre-Ahe1. The computation of the KRE of 100 values takes to each client 353 seconds (for t = 1), 336 seconds (for t = 2) and 441 seconds (for t = 100). The communication is 0.3 MB, 0.3 MB, Table 5 : Performance Comparison for 100 clients: C-Bits (resp. S-Bits) denotes the number of bits sent by each client (resp. the server). t is the secret sharing threshold, i.e., the number of clients that must contribute to the treshold decryption.
0.32 MB for each client and 56.07 MB, 56.12 MB, 60.56 MB for the server when t = 1, 2, 100, respectively. While being collusion-resistant and fault-tolerant as well, Kre-Ahe1 is less efficient than Kre-Ygc and Kre-Ahe2. The computation of the KRE of 100 values takes to each client 1024 seconds (for t = 1), 1749 seconds (for t = 2). The communication is 0.56 MB, 1.11 MB for each client and 111.37 MB, 222.67 MB for the server when t = 1, 2, respectively. For t = 100, our testbed ran out of memory.
We evaluated Algorithm 8 of Kre-She at security level at least 110. The result is illustrated in Figure 11a for inputs with bitlength µ = 16. The computation is dominated by the inputs' comparison and takes less than one hour for 25 clients. We also evaluated in Figure 11b the performance of the threshold decryption with a n-out-of-n secret sharing. For up to 40 clients threshold decryption costs less than 0.15 second. Kre-She is practically less efficient than all other schemes, but has the best asymptotic complexity.
As a result Kre-Ygc is suitable for a setting where the server is non-colluding and clients cannot fail. If collusion and failure are an issue, then either KreAhe1 or Kre-Ahe2 or even Kre-She is suitable. Kre-Ahe1 can be more time efficient than Kre-Ahe2 for up to 30 clients and a highly parallelizable server. Kre-She has the best asymptotic complexity, however, it requires more efficient somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes.
Conclusion
In this paper we considered the problem of computing the KRE (with applications to benchmarking) of n clients' private inputs using a server. The general idea of our solution is to sort the inputs, compute the rank of each input, use it to compute the KRE. The computation is supported by the server which coordinates the protocol and undertakes as much computations as possible. We proposed and compare different approaches based on garbled circuits or threshold HE. The server is oblivious, and does not learn the input of the clients. We also implemented and evaluated our schemes. As a result Kre-Ygc is suitable for a setting where the server is non-colluding and clients cannot fail. If collusion and failure are an issue, then either Kre-Ahe2 or Kre-She is suitable. Kre-She has the best asymptotic complexity, however, it requires more efficient somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes.
A ElGamal Encryption
The threshold decryption in Kre-Ahe1, Kre-Ahe2 has be implemented using elliptic curve ElGamal (ECE) [28] . We briefly present ECE and its threshold decryption [8] .
Let G be an elliptic curve group generated by a point P of prime order p.
The key generation chooses s $ ← Z p and outputs sk = s and pk = s ⋅ P as private and public key. To encrypt an integer m, one chooses r $ ← Z p and outputs the ciphertext c = (r ⋅ P, m ⋅ P + r ⋅ pk). To decrypt a ciphertext c = (α 1 , α 2 ), one computes Q = α 2 − α 1 ⋅ sk and solves the discrete logarithm on G. Let n, t be integers such that t ≤ n. To support t-out-of-n threshold decryption the secret key sk = s is secret-shared using Shamir secret sharing scheme [35] by choosing a random polynomial: f (x) = s + ∑ t−1 i=1 a i x i and computing secret shares
. Given t shares (1, s 1 ) , . . . , (t, s t ), the polynomial g(
⋅ s i is the same as f (x) since both have degree at most t − 1 and match at t points. Therefore s = f (0) = g(0) = ∑ t i=1 s i ⋅ l i . The numbers l i are called Lagrange coefficients. The threshold key generation outputs secret key shares sks i = (s i , l i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let I t ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be a subset of t clients and assume for simplicity I t = {1, . . . , t}. To decrypt a ciphertext c = (
and solve the discrete logarithm on G. This requires O(1) to each client C i , i ∈ I t and O(log t) asymmetric operations to the combiner.
B Security Proofs
Let the inherent leakage be L = {k, n, t, κ, λ, µ}, i.e., protocol's parameters. Theorem 1. If the server S is non-colluding and the AHE scheme is IND-CPA secure, then Kre-Ygc 1-privately computes F KRE in the semi-honest model with leakage L S = L i = L. Hence, there are simulators SIM Ci for each C i and SIM S for S such that:
Proof (Proof (Sketch)). The leakage is clear as parties see only random strings. View C i consists of:
For each m ∈ View C i , SIM Ci chooses random bit strings of length m . The view of the server consists of:
For each m ∈ View S , SIM S chooses random bit strings of length m . Theorem 2. Let t ∈ N and τ < t. If the server S is non-colluding and the AHE scheme is IND-CPA secure, then Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2 τ -privately compute F KRE in the semi-honest model with leakage L S = L i = L. Hence, let I = {i 1 , . . . , i τ }, L I = ⋃ i∈I L i , there exists a simulator SIM I such that:
Proof (Proof (Sketch)). The leakage is clear as parties see only random strings (IND-CPA ciphertexts, random shares or random bits).
In Kre-Ahe1 , all messages can be simulated by choosing random bit strings of the corresponding length. However, the simulation of Step 19 must be coherent with Step 25. Each client receives random shares in Step 19, runs the final decryption Decf (.) in Step 25 and learns a random bit. Let C l be a client with l ∈ I. To simulate Steps 19 and 25, the simulator chooses t random values for
Step 19 such that running Decf (.) returns the random bit simulated in Step 25. For example, if the underlying AHE is ECC ElGamal (ECE), then a ciphertext has the form c = (α 1 , α 2 ) = (r ⋅ P, m ⋅ P + r ⋅ pk). For each ECE ciphertext c = (α 1 , α 2 ) = (r ⋅ P, m ⋅ P + r ⋅ pk) that must be decrypted in Step 25, C l gets α 2 and t partial decryption results α 11 , . . . , α 1t of α 1 in Step 19. To simulate this, the simulator chooses a random bit b and a randomα 2 . Then it computes α 1 =α 2 − b ⋅ P and generates randomα 11 , . . . ,α 1t such that ∑ t i=1α1i =α 1 in G. The proof for Kre-Ahe2 is similar. Ciphertexts and random shares are simulated with equally long random strings and Steps 18 and 22 in Kre-Ahe2 are simulated as above for Steps 19 and 25 in Kre-Ahe1.
Theorem 3. Let t ∈ N and τ < t. If the server S is non-colluding and the SHE scheme is IND-CPA secure, then Kre-She τ -privately computes F KRE in the semi-honest model with leakage L S = L i = L. Hence, let I = {i 1 , . . . , i τ } denote the indexes of corrupt clients, L I = ⋃ i∈I L i denote their joint leakages and View I (x 1 , . . . , x n ) denote their joint views, there exists a simulator SIM I such that:
Proof. The leakage is clear as parties see only random strings (IND-CPA ciphertexts or partial decryption results). The security is also straightforward as the computation is almost completely done by the server alone and encrypted under an IND-CPA encryption. Moreover, the partial decryption reveals only partial result to each decryptor.
Recall that our adversary is semi-honest. In Kre-Ygc, a server collusion reveals all inputs to the adversary. In Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2, a server collusion only increase the leakage as long as the number of corrupted clients is smaller than t. For example in Kre-Ahe1, the adversary can learn the order of the inputs whose comparison bits are final decrypted by a corrupted client in
Step 25. In Kre-She, the KRE is homomorphically computed by the server such that the clients are only required for the decryption of one ciphertext encrypting the KRE. Moreover, the ciphertexts are encrypted using the threshold public key. As a result, assuming semi-honest adversary and a collusion set containing less than t clients, a server collusion leaks no more information than k, n, t, κ, λ, µ.
C Complexity analysis
In this section, we discuss the complexity of our schemes. We will use κ and λ as length of asymmetric ciphertext and symmetric security parameter.
C.1 Kre-Ygc Protocol
A GC for the comparison of two µ-bit integers consists of µ AND-gates resulting in 4µ symmetric ciphertexts [29, 30] . It can be reduced by a factor of 2 using the halfGate optimization [38] at the cost of performing two cheap symmetric operations (instead of one) during GC evaluation.
We do the analysis for the case where n is odd (the even case is similar). From Lemma 3, each client generates (n − 1) 2 GCs resulting in (n − 1)µ symmetric operations. The computation of encrypted comparison bits (Steps 6 to 16) and the computation of the KRE's ciphertext require O(n) asymmetric operations to each client. Finally, each client has to decrypt one ciphertext in Step 23. As a result, the computation complexity of each client is therefore O((n − 1)µ) symmetric and O(2n + 1) asymmetric operations. In communication, this results in nκ bits for the asymmetric ciphertexts, 2µλ(n − 1) 2 bits for the GCs and µλ(n − 1) 2 for the garbled inputs and nκ bits for handling the server's leakage. In total each client sends 2nκ + 3µλ(n−1) 2 . The server evaluates n(n − 1) 2 GCs each consisting of 2µ symmetric ciphertexts. Computing the rank (Steps 17 to 19) requires O(n log n + n) operations to the server. Finally, the server evaluates log n + n asymmetric operations to compute the KRE ciphertext for each client (Steps 23 to 24). The total computation complexity of the server is O(n(n − 1)µ) symmetric and O((n + 1) log n + 2n). In communication, the server sends n(n − 1) asymmetric ciphertexts in Steps 6 to 16, n asymmetric ciphertexts in Steps 17 to 19 and n asymmetric ciphertexts in Steps 23 to 24. This results in a total of (n 2 + n)κ bits. Step 38. This results in a total of O(µ + 2nµt + 2 log t + n + 1) asymmetric operations. Each client sends (2µ + 1)κ bits in Step 2, nµtκ bits in Step 17, κ bits in Step 28, eventually nκ bits in Step 35. This results in a total of (2µ + nµt + n + 2)κ bits for each client.
The main cryptographic operations of server happen in the evaluation of the Lin-Tzeng protocol in Step 4. The comparison of two values takes 2µ asymmetric operations. As a result the server performs O(2µn 2 ) asymmetric operations for all comparisons.
The server sends n 2 µtκ bits in Step 11 and (n 2 t + 1)κ bits in Step 19, tκ bits in Step 32 and ntκ bits in Step 37. This results in a total of (n 2 µt+n 2 t+nt+t+1)κ bits for the server.
C.3 Kre-Ahe2 Protocol
Since Kre-Ahe2 also requires the predicate Paired as Kre-Ygc, we do the analysis for the case where n is odd (the even case is similar). (when the client is tail) in Step 5, tκ bits in Step 16 and nκ bits in Step 23. This results in a total of (µ (n+1) 2 + 2n + t)κ bits for each client. The cryptographic operations of the server happen in ComputeKreAhe (Algorithm 6) that is called in Step 6 of Protocol 7. The server performs O(n 2 +n) asymmetric operations.
The server sends (µκ+(µ+1)κ)n(n−1) 2 bits in Step 5, ntκ bits in Steps 12 and 18, nκ bits in Step 25. This results in a total of ( (2µ+1)n(n−1) 2 + 2nt + n)κ bits for the server.
C.4 Kre-She Protocol
Each client has O(µ) computation cost (µ+1 encryptions in Step 2 and eventually one partial decryption in Step 10) and a communication cost of (µ + n + 1)κ bits.
The cryptographic operations of the server happen in ComputeKreShe (Algorithm 8) that is called in Step 4 of Protocol 9. The SHE comparison circuit has depth log(µ − 1) + 1 and requires O(µ log µ) homomorphic multiplications [11, 12] . For all comparisons the server performs, therefore, O(n 2 µ log µ) multiplication. In Step 10 of Algorithm 8, the computation of ⟦∏ n j=1,j≠k (r i − j)⟧ has depth log n and requires O(n log n) homomorphic multiplications.
Step 12 of Algorithm 8 adds an additional circuit depth and requires O(n) homomorphic multiplications. As a result, Algorithm 8 has a total depth of log(µ − 1) + log n + 2 and requires O(n 2 µ log µ + n log n + n) homomorphic multiplications. The server sends tκ bits in Step 7 and ntκ bits in Step 12 resulting in a total of (t + nt)κ bits.
